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An interesting development in human geography is the recent surge in the sub-discipline of
moral geogcaphy. 1 Many of these investigations
holc.I fast to the premise that proximity increases
the opportunity for ethical behavior, and therefore
moraJity has an inherently geographic dimension.
This proposition is remarkable because of how
mu ch it seems to resonate with common sense: if
individuals live near one another, they will likely act
we11 towards each other, even if each has differing
motivations for such behavior. Moral geography
locates ethics (and subsequently the possibility for
the good life) in place, in the interactions that occur between people within a bounded locale. This
articulation between place and the good life has
seen a revival in both academic and popular
thought about how to improve social life. One of
the forms this articulation has taken is the positing
of the need for greater community to ameliorate
how people live.
This paper is an attempt to take the urges of
moraJ geographers seriously, albeit more critically.
As such, this paper seeks to understand how community-as an articulation between people and
place-can be theorized to understand how community can express forms of co11cctive identification that do not necessitate an csscntializing
connection between identity and locality. uch limiting notions of identity arc dishonest to the growing interconnectedness of social life that
transcends many divisions established by localcbased community. l t is necessary, therefore, to
open up the parameters by which people can become beholden to one another rather than merely
relying upon proximity as the indicator (and limit)
of care and co11ective action.
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engage, and arc themselves engaged, at varying levels of competency, participation, and power. This process is more often a struggle between contested notions
and these varying levels of competency. As such, collective identification rather
than being an ideal form of experience is more akin to a struggle that occurs over
different meanings, interpretations, and expressions of that identity.
Similarly, while the experience of a globally compressed temporality and spatiality maintains its own uneven geography (one that incurs "localization" for parts
of the planet not incorporated within "global" networks), finding locales that arc
not infused with the artifacts and expressions of an cxpljcitly global world has become an arduous task. While globalization is by no means a unitary phenomenon,
globality makes it clear that people and places exist as part of spatial and temporal
processes, coalesce within varying scales, and arc increasingly connected through
technology, population flows, governance mechanisms, and capital flows. 5
Given the reali ty of a more interconnected world of processes, it seems that
the desire to locate the good life in bounded places is a tenuous and difficult expression both of people and place and of the geographic dimension of collective
forms of identification. As such, community based on notions of essential identity and place appears more as a nostalgic ideal and less as an honest appraisal of
how many experience contemporary social life. But, it is necessary to keep in mind
that, however idealistic, the desire for community and the associated articulation
with intimacy, propinquity, and care, is a strong response to a globalizing world
that many sec as increasingly risky, unstable, fractured, and difficult to navigate.
While more open experiences of community might be how many people experience the world, many people turn towards closed definitions of community to express a sense of control in a world with increasingly diffuse locations of power.
Moreover, community remains a powerful discourse through which divisions of
human beings continue to occur, divisions that can be, have been and continue to
be the basis for politics of exclusion. While closed community can form a basis of
empowerment for those who can claim membership (i.e. the various identity politics movements), ultimately this type of community is reactionary to divisions that
have been set up for the purposes of exclusion and denies the hybridity and
tran sculturation of identity which can serve as a more agcntic basis of power.
Therefore, it is necessary to understand how community can be a useful signifier
of processual ways to experience identity and place and ca n be a conduit for
beholdenness to others, a signifier that captures the fl ows with which more and
more people experience social li fe.
The leap of faith by moral geographers and many others that life lived in a
bounded place not o nly is a better life but also is even possible is common and
part of a ge neral "return,, to communjty that expresses a desire for a less fragmented, nurturing way of life in which people in places take care of one another.6
Community has come to signify the authentic life that orga nically grows in places,
in opposition to the alienation of modern society and its cver-expandjng reach
across place.7 This is especially pressing given how much the recent "return,, fits
with the emergi ng realization of a world in which an unencumbered civil society
serves as the backbone of social, political, and economic relations through which
everyone performs their civic responsibilities to one another outside of state apparatuses, a form of governmentaUty that necessitates so me expression of a com-
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I draw upon a range of emergent ideas that have emanated from-to use the
titles of two recent books--a theory of a community that posits social connection
between those who have nothing in common (Lingis), or more succinctly, community without unity (Corlett). While exploring the abstractions of the meaning
of community, I explicate community-building2-particularly urban communitybuilding programs employed as urban anti-poverty stratcgics--as a signifier
through which certain struggles (over urban redevelopment, post-welfare state social policy, shifts in public-private spacings, as well as forms of citizenship and
other mechanisms to claim the right to participate in the future of a place and social life) all pass to gain signification.
Assuming that community is important, this paper attempts to understand
how community can realize itself as a more open form of collective identification,
one that does not retreat to static identities or get too stuck in place. Often, community is thought of as an easily identifiable group of people who share a common location and who have dispositions towards common actions and
experiences. Such a definition necessitates that community members maintain and
demonstrate this commonness, lest the status of membership falters or is brought
into question. Given the ways in which such a framework for connecting community has been shown to be more about the struggle to maintain that disposition
(so that people arc either excluded from powerful communities or cordoned off
from power because of the community to which they belong),l this paper will argue. f~r a sense of commonality that always already exists among people through
sociality, and that always already binds them into relationships requiring ethical
e.ngagement. ~ommunity, therefore, is the process by which people can collecttvely engage different modes of identification from which social life unfolds and
gets experienced but which do not hinder responsive actions towards others. As
such, community without unity is a form of community that occurs when identity
and place are both treated as temporary constructions of material life that guide
but do not determine how people act
This paper, in sum, is an attempt to theorize community as a collective of dispositio.ns, or, more directly, a process towards dis-positionings, as opposed to a
collectton of ~eady~made dispositions. Rather than rehash the popular debates
ab.out the ~elatlonship between a need for communjty to repatch the social fabric,
~s paper is an ~ttempt to understand how, following Jean-Luc Nancy, "commu~ty, far .f~om bemg ~hat so~iety ~as crushed or lost, is J11hat happens to 11s-qucst1on, ':"~ttn~, e~cnt, in:ipcratlvc- 111 the J11ake of society" (The Inoperative Co1JJ1JJlflli!J
11; ongmal italics). T his pap~r advocates commuru ty without unity and attempts
to trace how such a commuruty can be conceptualjzed and realized in social life.

Why Community Without Unity?
More and. more,
. . closed ideas of identity and bounded notions of 1oca 1cs arc
harder to ma.mtam ma gl~baliz~g world. Identities arc infused with hybridity and
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mon fate, common sense, and common action, and a potential threat to communities of difference. 8 This growing concern to foster life at a local scale raises questions about belonging, questions which focus on who gets to participate in such
communities, how such communities get developed in a globalizing world, and
the dynamics of power that mediate how such communities are generated, maintained, interconnected, contested, and put into practice. rundamcntally, what
needs explication is what community means and how it can be something that
captures the experience of contemporary collective identification in the wake of
expanding experiences of globality. In taking on this challenge, it is necessary to
have a sense of how social subjects are able to recognize themselves in community, in common, and then, how that translates into a sense of bcholdcnncss
within a community without unity.

Understanding Performative Dispositions
''Perhaps the only way to understand the free 111e of the Je!f. a way that docs
not, ho~ever, treat existence as a property, is to think of it as a habit111, an
ethoJ. Being engendered from one's own manner of being is, in effect, the
ve_ry d~finition of habit (this is why the Greeks spoke of a second nature) ...
this bemg engendered from one's own manner is the only happiness rc.-ally
possible for humans."
- Giorgio Agamben, The Coming Comm1111i!J, original italics

'!'o begin to .understa.nd community in a more open manner, this paper turns

to Pierre Bourdicu's notl~n of the disposition, one that resonates and expands
upon ~o~e common ~ot:J.ons of how individuals relate to a community. Pierre
Bourdieu is often considered a social detcrminist, a thinker who believes thal the
experience of s~cial life is determined by clear forms of identity which interact in
a power-lad~n hi~rarchy to structure socicty.9 Contrary to this interpretation, however, Bour.dieu dtrects most of his attention on both how such forms of identity
get collectively constr.uctc~, as well as how agcntic maneuvering remains possible
when such forms of identity become strong group identities (particularly against
the .hege~ony that c~r~n group.s exert over othcrs).10 Fundamentally, Bourdicu
posits a ~iew of social life that 1S constantly in the making and constantly entrenched 111 str~gglcs over t~e powe~ to determine what then is made by society.
The~efore, turning to Bourdicu provides a way to begin to understand how community .can. be conceptualized as a more open concept and as one that helps govern social life.
Bourdieu rests his conception of social life upon the notion of th / b·t
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tion in society as well as changing this position. People with similar su bjective and
objective knowledge of their position in society express such knowledge through
similar, habitual mechanisms of " practical mastery." As common forms of habitual action arise in reaction to and in contestation of a known positionality,
people begin to recognize each other as being in similar positions and inhabiting
similar social rcalms, 13 and to practice life from within a similar habit11s (Bourdieu
"What Makes a Social Class?"). This occurs through society, which serves to uphold patterns and mechanisms of exchange between individuated subjects. Societal exchange allows subjects to recognize forms of commonality and the
possibility of collective action.
Bourdicu, therefore, assumes a certain interaction between individuals and society. But he docs not find that individuals arc merely purveyors of the social context in which they arc embedded. The habit11s is formed through the relationship
between the process of individuation and the processes reproducing social life.
Social life is not pre-given; rather, it is forged out of the intersections of individuated subjects and the habitual actions of these subjects as they encounter what
comes to be known as society (i.e. the system of these interactions). As these habitual actions get repeated and solidi fy into social acts that have meaning within
society (i.e. traditions, customs, and pcrformativc declarations that pronounce the
subject as part of and positioned in society), habit/IS takes form.
The habil11s, therefore, is the embodiment of habitual social acts that have
meaning within a group of subjects who similarly understand their positionality.
More discretely, the habit11s is the practiced form of a disposition to interpret (consciously or not) one's place in society. The disposition gains credence when it becomes reificd as "second nature" to a subject as a guide to action: dispositional
action is guided by less-than-conscious beliefs that such action is the proper way
to act. For a disposition to lessen its steering force, a subject must be able to recognize it as a disposition, rather than the " natural" way to be.
It is important to remember that the habit11s is constructed of both structured
structures and str ucturi1~ structures, giving the habit11s and dispositions malleability over time. By indicating how society simultaneously functions as a no un (systematic structure of relations), a verb (structured system of relations), and a
gerund (structuring system of relations), Bourdicu is able to convey that society is
a system in the making, something that is constantly being created through the
ways in which dispositions arc practiced and recognized. Changing the habitual
practices of subjects and the structuring structures of social life can alter dispositions.
In order for such changes to have any sort of social mcanjng (and therefore
bearing o n collective identification), subjects must recognize the various functions
of society towards the maintenance of a disposition. These functions interrelate
to maintain meaning for a dispositio n in what Bourdicu calls the il/11sio (The Logic
of Practice). The il/11sio is the set of taken-for-granted beliefs that arc necessary for
dispositiona l action to make sense given a subject's position in society. ln other
word s, the il/11Sio represents the "rules of the game" which arc played out by the
dispositiona l action of habit11s (The &ties of A ri). While these rules have objective
meaning, according to Bourdicu, only those operating within the il/11sio truly know
the " rules," and, therefore, o nly those with such knowledge can know how to
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it is what a collectivity of subjects enacting similar dispositional action acts upon,
and the very justification for action. Society is the collection of struggles for doxa
to appear as real, through which subjects can imagine themselves in common with
one another.
The disposition, for Bourdieu, is at th e heart of subjectivity. Nestled somewhere between rational free will and determinism by structure, the clisposition is a
fusion of the epistemological and the ontological: it is the basis of how one
knows the world (the doxa) and how that knowing is a statement of how one is in
the world. Yet what seems underdeveloped in Bourdieu's thought is how the disposition emerges, or whether it is an a priori device from which one can formulate
an analysis of the social and engage social life. At times Bourdieu does seem to fall
back on an a priorization of the disposition (perhaps as the essential building
block of subjectivity that fuses rather than problcmati~cs the categories of individual and society). I fc docs claim that the operation between habi111s and the field
is twofold: the field conditions hobit11s (and subsequently the dispositional structure that inform habit/IS) and hobit11s gives meaning to the field (Wacquant). But
this assumes that the dispositional capability within subjectivity is already present
and not revealed simply at the moment this relatio nal activity between field and
hobit11s occurs. The historical process of this relation brings forth the disposition
into social life, dcmarking its limits and clarifying its formulation of a certain
doxa, yet this historicization necessitates a dispositional structure to always already
exist in social subjects, rather than be a historical contingency itself. The way out
of this, it seem s, is in how Bourdieu understands identity formation.
Tf disposition is the heart of subjectivity, then the practices of multiple subjects from dispositions in similar points in the social realm form the basis of a
Bourdicusian theory of community. But the practice of dispositional subjectivity
by multiple subjects docs not necessitate group formation and communal action
in everyday life. Bourdicu acknowledges that in the rclationality of the field, the
illusion, and the hobit11s that brings to fore the sociality of subjects, there is a distinction between "classes on paper" (or theoretical groupings of subjects) and an
actual group mobilized in common struggle. 15 'l'his distinction arises because, in
the words of Stuart ff all, there is no necessary correspondence between knowing
one's position and acting according to the logic that would best improve one's position in society (a logic that always hinges on capital accumulation for Bourdieu).
Indeed, while Bourdieu's sociology offers an insight as to how similarly
dispositioncd subjects can recognize themselves conceptually as in common, it
does not provide elucidation into how similarly dispositioncd subjects could or
should act upon this recognition.
In Bourdieu's formulation, he shortcuts from the epistemological othering
necessary for identity formation (i.e. knowing that different positions in society
exist but that similar positions can allow for similarity in identity through processes of categorization) to the ontological positioning that populate such forma tions (i.e. all those with similar doxa arc necessarily within the same category and
identity). Jn part, this can be restated to say that Bourdieu glosses over how the
articulation of different social identities informs the interpellation of subjects
into those identities. This shortcut can be expanded and clarified by recognizing
how this occurs via social performatives, social pcrformatives that Bourdieu mar-
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change dispositional action in a socially meaningful way. Knowledge of the il/11sio
is a precondition for collective action and altering collective forms of identification.
Altering the embodied, dispositional practices of habit11s comes from a fusion
of objective and subjective knowledge (what Bourdieu calls "structural
constructivism" (Fowler 17)) and is an agentic process to work within the dispositions of a habit11s. The relationship between a subject and the trifold concept of
society, mediated by habit11s, is similar to a musician and a composition: while the
musician plays a structured tune, there is significant room for improvisation (011tli11e). Indeed, Bourdieu offers that the ability to master one's hobit11s is the ultimate
source of freedom ("Scattered Remarks"). In other words, meaningful improvisation of action is the freedom to change in society that all subjects potentially can
enact. Enacted collectively, the entire basis of a group identity (i.e. common dispositions) can change and be more strategically constructed to establish a "better," more powerful position in society. As with any system, perturbations can
have an effect throughout; society is not indifferent to the improvisations of subjects as they navigate habit11s and create new forms of dispositional activity.
. Bourdieu conceives of society as a struggle over the better position amongst
differently empowered groups of collective subjects. Two sets of relation ships
guide subjectivity: the first, discussed above, occurs primarily between individuated subjects in how they recognize one another as in a common and collective
action that ~mbodies a shared habit11r, the second refers to the relationship that
these group!ngs have amongst other, differently clispositioned groupings. This latter relationship occurs within fields, or, the "systems of objective relations which
are the products of the institution of the social in things, or in mechanisms that
have ~he qua~i-reali~ of ph.ysical objects" (Wacquant 44). The reality of society is
expenenced in the interactlon between different subject positions within certain
fields. Fields take form around valorized relations and reified entities which rccei~e valu~ as forms of capital, including financial, symbolic, cultural,' and social
capital. D1ffe.rent fi~lds ~alorize certain forms of capital over others. The struggle
amongst social subjects is to accrue valorized capital in the appropriate field that
can lead to a better position in society for themselves and for similarly
dispositioned subjects.
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ginally discusses in guise of the politics of naming. Stepping o ff from Bo urdicu's
initial insights, the ability to think and act co mmunity witho ut unity becom es
dearer, particularly as an ongoing process of identity making.
Bourdieu does offer this: " this wo rk of categorizatio n, i.e. of making-explicit
and of classification, is performed incessantly, at every mo ment of ordinary existence, in the struggles in which agents clash over the meaning o f the social world
and of their position within it, the meaning o f their social identity" ("The ocial
Space" 729). H e does recognize that there is wo rk to be done to uphold the categories of identity (tho ugh this work is no t ideological, it is doxic) and that subjects arc no t magically transposed into identities simply because certain
classification schemes exist. But what seems missing is the technology of this interpellatio n that conjoins the classificatio n (identi fication) with certain
subjectivities residing in similar dispositional structures that can be usefully un derstood as classes (identities). In other words, how do classes o n paper become
classes in action? A nd how do they materialize into a collective of subjects who
act beholden to one another?
In part, this lack is one limitatio n of Bourdicu's wo rk fo r thinking thro ugh
community witho ut unity, for he too o ften assumes that if a subject is classified by
another subject who has more capital than the former, the agentic struggle of improvising class meaning docs no t occur until after the latter has classified the
for~~r, ~a~g the ?ispos.itio nal actions of both subjects simply determined by
pos11:1onality tn a societal hierarchy. In o ther words, he is too quick to assume that
with the authority backed by the right capital, the pcrformativc classificato ry utterances of those of higher rank in society easily creates the classification realities of
th o~e lower ~ social position, therefore limiting the improvisational abili ty of
subjects. Judith Butler pursues a similar poin t in critiquing Bou rdicu'R use of
Austin's per.formative p~osophy of language ("Performativity's Social Magic").
A ccording to Bourdieu, subjects arc both classified and classifiers simul taneously, t~ough with the uneven distributio n o f capital and the uneven powe r different subjects and g roups can utilize, not all arc eq ually classified and classifiers.
~ut while the classification is an on-going struggle, the social pcrformativc to classify serves as a weak basis to hail o thers into a classification. AlJ subjects arc
classed, but some are more classed than o thers. In Bourdicu's own theorization
t~at makes capital accum~l~~on the detc~mining facto r in dispositio nal improvisatton, he falls back o n stabilizing the classificatio ns that he wants to keep as " classes
on paper."

In pa.rt, Bourdieu is limited by his use o f performatives as mere exchanges in
a sym~oli~ ec?nomy of language. The use o f pcrformativcs is bo und by the un-

Bo urdieu seems to argue that meaning is pre-social. J Jenee, identities are brought
into being by being named, b ut only if these names arc already recognizable as
names, as identities, as possible positions of subjectivity, as already having meaning. l'or Bourdjeu, this namjng is done by the authority always al read y given that
power to nam e: "the holder of the monopoly of official 11an1i11g' ("The Social
Space" 734). This fixing of authority to name thro ugh the technology of the official, the public,' 6 seems to undermine any understanding that might be gained
from Bourdieu about dispositional activity as more than a reaction to a pre-determined structure of meaning: dispositional activity, whether collective or not, can
o nly be a struggle against what has already been named.
This might not seem to bode well to fu rther explore communjty witho ut
unity, for the unity is seemingly already achieved in this theorization and the " improvisational" move becomes to remove the unity rather than to begin from commun ity without unity. The disposition, it seems, is in the last instance determined
by how it has always already been named by authority, not the supposed basis by
which a subject can position itself to claim naming through improvisation. H owever, thjs actually serves as a fou ndation to move closer towards community without unity, particularly if the dispositio n is problcmatized further as a point of
departure for pcrformative struggle (that has discursive as well as material outcomes). T hat is, it is necessary to fu lly pursue what Bourdicu means when he
writes the class-on-paper: it " is not really a class, an ac/11al class, in the sense of a
g ro up, a group mobilized for struggle; at most, it might be called a probable clasl'
("The Social Space" 725). In other words, it is necessary to pursue not only how
classes, identities and the subjects inhabiting such formations arc fu nctions of articulatio n and in tcrpcllation (Laclau and Mou ffc), but also how groupings are always probable, always in po te ntial, and therefore always lacking in unity (but not
necessarily unification). Before T return to how this potential is engendered in the
very constructio n of the habit11s and its dispositional structures that bring identificatio n and eventually community witho ut unity to the fore by its performative
namings, the meaning of potentiali ty needs elaboration. To fu lly explore the
struggle that Bourdicu seems to close off in the last instance, it is necessary to
turn to the philosophers of potential, particularly Jean-Lu c Na ncy.

Nancy and Diasporic Retreats of Freedom
"Being-called or being-in-language is the non-predicative property par
excellence that belongs to each member of a class and at the same time
makes its belonging an aporia."
- G iorgio Agamben, The Coming Com1m111iry

even distribution o f the cu.ltural. and symbolic capital that informs a subject how
to ~se. them properly. While this economy is framed by the ill11Sio and field in
which 1t operates, ~ourdicu seems to already assume a closure about the meaning
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Similar to Bourdicu, N ancy seeks to understand how collectio ns of individuals come together outside of an a priori basis of essential identity for common
actio n. r Jowever, befo re o ne attempts to sec the connectio ns, o ne mu st reconcile
the extre me differences between the two and the limits on simply fusing the two
together into a new way to think of community. As such, o nly cer tain concepts
overlap and o nl y p rovisio nally, and this paper will focus further on these poin ts,
leaving aside the incommensurable disagreements.
With that disclaimer, it is important to note that while Bourdicu reconciles the
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.
W~ile Nancy moves through the logic of communitarianism quickly to its end
m fascism and totalit~rian po~~cs, it is easy to follow his logic, and the basis of his
argument follows ant1-essenoalist
. .
. efforts
. in identity work · At th e t'lea rt o f N ancy 's
thoughts on co~muruty 1s th~ moperatlve community: ino perative because it docs
not. work. Working commuruty,
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· as a
.
.
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· ·1s mad e,
.
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the struggle over what commun ity means. Once that struggle achieves resolve, the
process of that happening ends and com m unity becomes an operative function to
reproduce that resolve. Jn other words, o nce a community resolves itself as a
community of something (i.e. Germanness), then the communi ty has a purpose:
to maintain that something via its reproductio n (i.e. its Germanness, by getting rid
of all of the non-Germans). Once community has a purpose, it becomes operative and necessitates technologies to uphold that purpose. As Nancy's allusions indicate, these technologies always have the potential to turn into physical violence.
l'or Nancy, individuals are always already within a context of sociality, not pregiven entities brought into social life or constructed out of society. 20 Subjectivity is
a matter of finitude in the sense that identification is contingent on another to signi fy the limits of the self and to recognize the self as a difference (Jngram). Thus,
being is always being-with (ITcideggcr's Mitdasei11 that comes before Dasei11), and
the basis of subjectivity is in sharing.21
This then appears as the logical precursor to Bourdieu's d ispositional activity.
In Bourdieu's sociology, Nancy would argue that dispositions do not o nly beget
their imp rovisational characteristics and insight in to a greater societal context, but
more importantly, engender (and arc formed by) other dispositions. A significant
difference in the two sets of ideas revolves around the categorization of these dispositions. For Bourdicu, the interaction among dispositions occurs in the realm of
meaning, meaning which has been shown to be a pre-given entity of society in the
above analysis, so that dispositional activity is recognized by individuated subjects
as in common, as similar, as performativcly sharing meaning. Dispositions, then,
seem to be a priori catego rized. Theoretical classes can easily slide into classes in
social life. For Nancy, however, dispositional activity is recognized by subjects because it is recogn ized as uncommon, as different, as co ntesting shared meaning.
As difference is a fundame ntal concept of subjectivity, it is the sharing of difference (via exchange) that is at the heart of sub jectivity. Dispositional activity is
on ly realizable in the express io n of di fference through exchange. Difference must
be uph eld, or exchange ceases to occur. As thinkers from Aristotle to Marx have
recognized, it is difference that makes exchange possible, for interlocutors in exchange o nly engage exchange because the other has something or is something
different. The commonality resides in the existence of for ms of exchange, forms
of exchange wh ich get reworked in everyday li fe to become acts of sharing, not
just exchange. O ut of these mechanisms of excha nge, which form the basis for
social life (tho ugh not in a ny necessarily structured manner), subjectivities can recognize how dispos itio nal activity can be constructed as similar. T he realization of
being in common is a concept that must necessarily be constructed, constructed
in certain ways, and main tains little correspondence to how different subjectivities
approach exchange. Thus, Bourdieu's "class o n paper" gets constructed and purposefull y enacted to become a real class, a real configuratio n of dispositions, but
only after much wo rk is conducted to make this transition possible- work which
never reaches an end. Therefore, in contrast to Bo urdicu, N an cy views collectivity
and community as so mething to be generated by social subjects not uncovered by
them given the proper doxa. Nancy insis ts that community is the ever-occurring
effort to make a "class on paper" become real through shared exchange and that
community sho uld not have to wo rk itself in this manner.
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power of the state as an authoritative structure in identity fo rmatio n (and ultimately calling upon an increased state presence as a fortification against the increased social stratification wrought b y neo-liberal globalizatio n, 1' Nancy explicitly
wants to move away from formalized structures such as states (in the sense that
states have been understood as 11atio11-states) bound to definitive geographies of
belonging and territory (Van Den Abbecle). However, he also wants to avoid the
individualism of neo-liberalism (Dallmayr). While both Bourdieu and Nancy write
from a France deeply implicated in a post-Fordist social formation and accelerated
globalization, Nancy seems to be more willing to embrace this epoch as o ne of
positive change, even given the struggles that emerge (as exemplified for him by
the massacres of contemporary Sarajevo). While Bourdieu at times wants to hang
onto the historical geographies o f struggle, Nancy seems to desire a more poetic
geography of community that explodes the hegemonic geographies rooted in
roots. Nancy, seeking the deferral of geography as part of commo n identity (i.e.
the French or the Germans), seems to be a poetic geographe r of diaspora and dispersal.

Whil~ Nancy's work is at times impenetrably dense, he docs directly address
the .questJon of community, explicitly advocating for community without unity.
~e he ~cfines community in numero us ways (community as ecstasy, commuruty as finitude, community as myth) 18 to refuse a singular definition, he docs push
towa_rds. c~mmuni~ as forged in potential. T he potential for community is com~uruty 10 itself, wh1ch Nancy terms "for itsclf"-"ipseity" (The Inoperative Co1111n11111ry). Th~ c~alescence of that potential into actuality is its mo ment of fixity, and
such f~ty 1.s death. The. essentializing logic of any mo ment of fixity is what
Nancy 1d~~tlfi~s as' th~ uruty. that kills co~munity (or rather, the unity from which
commuruttes kill): 'Wtth 11111tary community lco1111J11ma11tl 1111eJ there is nothing but
deat~, ~ad not the sort of death found in the cemetery, which is a place of spacing
or distJnctness, but the death found in the ashes of crematorium ovens or in the
accumulati,ons of cha_rnel-ho~s~s" (Bei11g Si11g11/ar Pl11ral 154-5; original italics).19
Nancy s hyperbolic descnptJo ns warn against actualizing a Bourdieusian "class
o~ p~per'' without accounting fo~ ~~w that " class o n paper" discounts the improvisations that occur when collectJv1ttes actually happen in social li fe. While Nancy
may seem nihilistic, h~ alludes to numerous examples of such communi ty at work
~uch .as German ~az1sm (based on the operationalization of an essential A ryan
1dentJty)'.the B~sruan-~erb ~nd the Hutu and Tutsi genocides (similarly justified
by essentJal n.otJons. of 1de~~ty and the threat to a community and its way of life),
and .rrenc~ ng~t-wmg ?olitt~s (such as Le Pen and his associated politics of fraterruty, nationality, and 1solattonism).
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To argue that community does not nor should not work is not to argue that
there is no activity necessary to bring forth community. Rather, it is to posit the
opposite: that community based on immanent essence needs to work because the
basis of community is the constant and active unworking, or deferral, of es22
sence. Community is oot ao organic force bringing people together and connecting these people to a place. Rather, community needs to be articulated through
communication: the active engagement of subjectivities being-with one another
that calls attention to the betweenness of subjects. This betweenness is not a bond
because a bond assumes independent entities that exist on either end of the bond.
Through communication, finite subjects do not appear in social life (because they
are always already implicated in it); rather, communication is the act of what
Nancy calls "compeara11ci' (The Inoperative Co111111111Jity). Co111peara11ce is the exposure
of the self through the other in which the self is able to recognize its own finitude
aod, therefore, realize that its subjectivity is a condition that presupposes togetherness (i.e. Nancy's version of individuation, but a version that docs not achieve
~n end for ~s process, as being is always being with another and becoming). Bewg together is the movement of being-with articulated as being-in-common (different than belonging or unity) through communicative acts. Communication is
the activity of sharing-not just exchange-that finds its ultimate realization and
arti~ula~on in the myth of co~~nity. Because singularity is always already expos10g itself through commurucation and myth, individuation as it occurs in liberal thought does not exist; the only reality is relational.
It seems necessary to point out the emergent intersections with Bourdicu.
While Nancy problcmatizes subjectivity with greater complexity than Bourdieu,
one can see that both pursue a subjectivity that situates itself in a relational reality.
The exposure that Nancy writes on, the transcendental sociality that resides in the
betwe~nn~ss of ~ommu~cation through difference, seems roughly similar to a
Bo~rdieusian notion .of dispositions that emerge as already implicated in the histon~~ str uggles for~ng the fields, the ill11sio and the habit11s through which the dispos1tlon ex~rcss~s itself. The disposition might well be argued as the historical
fo:m .of be10g-with. To. argue this, clarification is needed to work through its implications for commuruty without unity, and further elucidation must occur to
hi~hligh~ Nancy's work on myth and sharing as the articulations that bring forth
b~mg-:'~th (compeara11ce)~ or~ in Bourdicusian terms, the particular ill11Sio in which
dispos1tlons engage social life and become the basis for an actual, realized class.
For Nancy,. it is. throug~ com~unication that community without unity
em~rges as a p~int of ~nopcrative shanng. The myth that compcars, following this
~ogic, exp.oses ~mgulanty ~s th~ constan~ difference of shared identification: myth
is the articulation that brings into relation "the inscr1'pa'on of
·
h
. .
.
a meaning w ose
~anscen~encc 1s md~firutely and constitutively deferred ... the practice of a sharing o~ (d1fferentj voices a~d of an articulation according to which there is no singul~r.1ty but th~t exposed m common" (The Inoperative CoiJJIJtlllli{y BO). Myth is the
acllv1ty that brings together because it maintains the traces of th h' t · I ·
.
c 1s Ortea articulations from acts of compeara11ce. Myths arc not o nly the stories we tell ourselves
but also the. way by which we tell ourselves. Myths arc always already publi~'
shared, and m that sense performative il locutionary acts of
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commumcatton. ut
while myth provides the enframing of compeara11ce, the constant deferral of the

60

meaning of myth is always already present because of inherent differences, and
myth is also a point at which unity might be closed to end this deferral. Myth can
become operative if it is worked to interrupt the deferral and if it establishes itself as more than myth (similarly to how doxa is emancipatory knowledge only if
it is recognized as doxa rather than truth). The imperative moment of freedom,
then, arises as the always present potential to interrupt myth's interruption of deferral.
In other words, the attempt to re-work myth as an interruption of deferring
meaning, which lends itself to giving meaning to those subjectivities communicating and positioning themselves through the myth, is an attempt to fix myth. To fix
myth is a gesture towards believing in myth past myth: to make myth truth. This
attempt at closure is an attempt at closing identification into identity. Nancy recognizes that this attempt is the very heart of political struggle in a post-fi'ordist
social formation in which the enhancement or flexibility is attempted to be resolved by fixity (i.e. multiculturalism that csscntializes difference). The reaction of
exposing identity to deferred meaning can be to close more strongly the meaning
of identity (i.e. close the myth-meaning of Gcrmanness at the very moment of its
exposure as constant deferral into true Germanncss). Community without unity is
a gesture to resist the closure of myth. Because modernity has been a series of
processes to close myths, of creating identities (and subsequently identity politics), the agcntic political project of a post-modern epoch is to actively defer:
"Community then becomes the production and the appropriation of a pre-given
identity" (Dcvisch 246-7).
What emerges here is Nancy's reconciliation with a world that he claims is
"anything but a sharing of humanity" (Being Si11g11/or P/11ralxiii). It is a world that is
in constant struggle between fixity and deferral, between roots and routes. In this
world, Nancy finds freedom in the very being-with that constitutes what might be
called our contextual ontology. ln this world, Nancy secs freedom emergent in the
ability to engage one's potential for deferral, to be against fixity. However, one can
only do so within the confines of a shared myth, or else move beyond being-with
in to ipscity; Nancy wants co-ipseity (Bei11g Si11g11/or P/11ro~.
But what, or where, is this identification without identity or community without unity? It resides in the dispersal of diaspora.23 In diaspora, one's very being is
deferred and meaning is always on the run. Diaspora is the basis of freedom because it provides the social formation of interruption of meaning while simultaneously providing a myth that is constantly being reworked from a number of
infinite points in an infinite number of ways. Diasporic identification comes without nation, without a metaphysics of presence articulated through identity. In
diaspora, one ic.lentifies not with identity, but with myth, with the active process of
identity malcing. Jn doing so, one compears into social li fe, and one can begin the
politics of refusing the commu nity that is death.
This politics of refusal is the potential that we share, a potential that emerges
in a historical conjuncture of dispersal, such as the current era of mass migration,
flexible accumulation, globalization, and the subsequent "postmodernization" of
identity (l'urncr "Liberalism Citizenship"). In this way, Nancy seems to call for a
citizenship of diaspora: one that denies the neo-liberal dream of global citizenship
so implicated in a project of globalization from "above," yet one that recognizes
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that the local practice of that citizenship docs not necessitate fixing that citi'l.cnship to the place where it can be enacted and lived (as in the nation-state). It seems
that citizenship in Nancy's world is relegated to the scale of communfry, as long as
it is community without unity.

If it appears that Nancy's politics of negativity is no politics at all, or politics
of utopia, it is with good reason. Nancy deliberately hopes to retreat from the political as it is often understood, particularly by the Left (Sparks). This is necessary
because politics has become the very act of fixity, and Nancy, in wanting to allow
~~ten~ty. to flourish, must pursue a politics of mclce, or melange, in which polincal tdentlty does not exist (Being Si11g11/ar P/11ra~. Jn the end of his logk, politics
must also be re-imagined as inoperative, as unworking itsel f, as a politics of
24
"whatever" (Agamben). In the end, politics is not about articulating anc.J intcrpellating a condition of belonging (and therefore engaging the hegemonic
struggle to make classes), but about belonging as always potential, always probable, alw~ys in dis~ersal and deferral. Politics and community remains a process of
the creation of different myths that allow for that belonging to never be interrupted, or made to belong.

Towards Community Without Unity: The Politics of Dispositionings
"Th~ antimony of ~e indi.v~du~ and the universal has its origin in language
· · · it transforms smguJant1es into members of a class, whose mcanjng is
defined by a common property."
- Giorgio Agambcn, The Comi11g CommH11i(J

At ~his point it is possible to bring Bourdicu and Nancy together to formulate
a m~arung for co~munity without unity. To do so, the argument will focus on
mo:~g _from basmg. subjectivity in dispositions to dis-positions, to111ords dispos1.tiorungs. By .rooting subjectivity at a point of dis-positioning, a point of potential, .commu~ty becomes understood as the sharing of dis-positionings in a
mo~~ direct ~olitic~ ~ha~ Nancy's eventual retreat to negativity. After outlining this
politics of dis-postti.omngs, based in community without unity, r will attempt to
demonsu:ate how this can be seen in action via the possible counter-work to the
hegemonic contemporary anti-poverty efforts of post-welfare state urban community-building.
At heart, ~is-positio?ings is a ~crmcn.cutic project that recasts Nancy's use of
the hermenmetn, or shanng of voices with Bourdicu's call t d
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curring to shape the field , il/11Jio and hobit11s in which it can be known as a disposition. While Bourdicu fails to adequately problcmatizc subjectivity-he merely
identifies the point of convergence-Nancy attempts to think about djs-positions
as moments of compearo11ce in social life, a notion that seems to more fully explore
Bourdicu's aims.
Nancy writes, "rOJne is not in the disposition without being with the otherdisposition, which is the very essence of dis-position" (Being Si11g11/or P/11rol 97).
That is, because of the impossibility of liberal individuation (by which one can
only think of singularities), subjectivity is always already implicated in social life
through its exposure in social life. Subjectivity is always already in the process of
becoming-with another, making itself and its other (co-ipseity). A disposition is
never a single point that closes the individual from society but instead the very relationship, the betweenness, of indivic.Juals and social life. While a disposition
maintains distinction from the historical-geographic conjuncture that bears it, it is
also constituting and constitutive of the others in that conjuncture. For Nancy,
this is being singu lar plural. For Bourdicu, it is the limit of a shared hobit11s. l•or
both, and for thinking through community without unity, it is the basis of the potential of community.
But how docs the dis-position bear upon itself and another? In the dis-position, the process of identification arises as the ability for a dis-position to share
meaning. Dis-positions, as deferred places of subjectivity, somehow interrupt the
flow of deferred signification to forge communication. But communication, as
myth or doxa, must not stop the flow; it need only redirect the flow into a shared
communication. But how docs a dis-position give basis to interrupt deferred
meaning without falling back into the trappings of community with unity?
Through the performativc acts of dispersal that allow a common myth to prevail
yet be infinitely reworked through a process of dis-positioning.
To rework this, the question can be posed differently: how docs a subject (assu ming, again, that subjectivity is fleeting) come to know itself as a subject, to
have meaning? The short, phenomenological answer is through the Other, yet
Nancy and those around him have s hown that there is a longer answer necessary,
particularly if the subject is to reconcile shifting subjectivity. Yet social life is a
realm in which infinite deferrals arc an ideal state of affairs. Concrete reality (still
very relational) is about struggles over positionings to define meaning, and these
struggles transpire over efforts of fixing and unfixing. At times the fixing achieves
near closure (such as the near closure of the meaning of Gcrmanncss under
Hitler) and at times the unfixing seems more dominant (such as on the confused
streets of Seattle a few years ago). Social life is lived through these struggles of
position, throug h the politics of dis-positioning. 'lb know where this politics
might begin, it is necessary to know how a singularity is positioned and how that
positioning is an intcrpcllation into a class, eventually to find how that class is articulated as unitary community. From knowing this, one can activate the work to
dis-position, always alrcac.ly begun. One can explicitly engage in dis-positionings
by pursuing the limits of the hermeneutic that provic.Jcs a basis for unitary community (given by the limits of the shared meaning of pcrformativc acts). This
then becomes an cveryc.lay struggle for freedom, and the basis for community
without unity.
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Subjects are uttered as certain subjectivities, brought into being through discourse, which is the always already base of communication and foundation of a
social formation. While not everything is discursive, the djscursivc serves as a
foundational link to the non-discursive through the social pcrformativcs that reveal what is possible through discourse, through articulation. I Jowcvcr, just because one says something docs not make it happen or true, and Bourdicu is
correct to identify that certain sayers can impose their sayings as truth more easily
than others. Discourses are not fields without power. 'fhc sharing of myth is an
ideal, not a descriptive statement Even so, there arc limitations on how communication is a shared myth: one must not necessarily believe it as truth, but one must
be able to recognize it as myth, as communication, as doxa, as emergent from the
historical-geographic horizons of meanings available to defer towards. One must
be within the bounds of an ill11sio in order to recognize the power of the
performativc classifications that served to fix one in a position and class, into an
identity and a place.

without unity seems to emerge at the boundary of meaning as such. While further
work is necessary to elaborate many of the ideas within this paper, particularly in
regards to empirical work, this paper has established some initial grounding to
think about community without unity. At heart, community without unity is community forged in the struggle to compear and give meaning to that co1npeara11ce,
without settljng that struggle. Communjty without unjty is struggle in itself,
against itself. This struggle is occurring right now, in the efforts to "return to
community" and the hegemonic struggles that vie for the meaning of community-and for defining the boundaries of belonging-in many contemporary
places.

Building Community in the City
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Many of these concerns can be empirically investigated by turning to the urban arena. Jn the contemporary U.S. city, there is a current trend of rewriting the
city from a place of pathology to a space of hope. 27 This can be seen in the recent
wave of gentrification, the promotion of the neo-traditional development model
in urban planning, and even in the rTope vr housing program developed by the
U.S. Department of I rousing and Urban Development. Much of this reworking is
occurring through the development of community, by which increasing the experience of community in the city will presumably increase quality of life. 28 The turn
to community in many cities simultaneously occurs when more and more cities
express global ambition, and purposively attempt to achieve positions in a global
urban infrastructure as "global citics." 29
Most poignant is the turn to community in post-welfare state anti-poverty
work in the city. Much of this work has focused on building community to stave
off endemic, spatially concentrated poverty, particularly to increase community
capacity and neighborhood-level social capital. 30 Programmatic efforts to build
community unquestioningly sec community as a good because it is assumed to be
the natural functioning of human interaction. While people should naturally relate
through community, some sec it as necessary to impart efforts to build community for others who supposedly lack it.
Ultimately, this community-building work-ever present in urban civil society
from settlement houses to Community Action organizations to Community Development Corporations-is seeing its solidification as a primary model to change
the condition of impoverished, central city areas. The rise of such vast efforts as
Comprehensive Community-building Initiatives (CCis) and faith-based development programs, sanctioned by the state, puts an intensified concentration on civil
society to solve social problems via the idea of community.
Urban community-building is the explicit attempt to have local actors take
control of their immediate context. It represents programmatic endeavors between impoverished neighborhood residents, philanth ropies, and government
agencies to have resident-lead strategics generated and deployed to solve problems. These problems, and the solutio ns to them arc conceptualized as generally
pertaining to poverty, but arc treated as having particular nuances in different localities. The scale of these localities becomes the neighborhood, and a connection
is made between the scale of the neighborhood and the scale of the communjty to
be built. The parameters of community-buildjng, therefore, stretch to the limits
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The community without unity that finds its basis in dis-positionings seems to
be forged at the limits of the social pcrformativcs, at the very horizons of the ability to act through discourse, to communicate (in Nancy's sense of co11peara11ce).
The community without unity is brought to bear by subjects who arc able to recognize th~ir subjectivity as a positionality brought into social Life through a
performative act of compeara11ce within the rubric of an il/J1sio, a dispersed, deferring myth. In other words, the community without unity is constructed at the limit
b~tween deferrals of meaning and the ability to be within the il/11sio that rccogruzes the ~efe~rals as su.ch,~ as still meaning something but exposed as meaning.
Communi~ without unity ts the space opened up when meanings can be actively
contested m terms of what they mean, precisely because they arc knowable as
meaning. To imagine this is to imagine a cultural politics that "would seek to let
the 'unworking' communication of community occur, or prevent its inhibition"
(F~nsk xxvi). Dis-po~itio~jng becomes the active unworking of positionings, of
uruty, ~nd pursues 1111ificat1011 at the moments when the space for community without uruty opens.
In this spac.c of unjficati.on of the community without unity, the struggle is at
heart over naming, an~ p~ticularly over naming community. This struggle, however, must be the end m itself, not something that could ever be resolved. These
~truggles are al.ways already occurring; calling for community without uni ty is callmg for the active engagement with such spacings. Because these aporias arc not
everywhere and egu~y accessible, the politics of naming begins with the active
search for the aponas (for the spaces in which to pursue community without
unity) an~ seeks to dwell in these spaces of refusal. Com munity without unity occurs. on sites where the s~rugglc over meaning takes place, where meaning is rccogruz~d 1101 .as false co~sc1ousness but as doxa, as il/J1sio, as myth. This politics can
close in on itself, and if so, further spacings must be found.
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of neighborhood, assuming that this allows a level of familiarity and local knowledge to coalesce into community capacity and social capital.
What is problematic is how such a community gets closed off, particularly the
spatial processes that lead to the area being coded as in need of community development. Many community-building initiatives occur concomitantly with a general
effort to revitalize an urban area. Such general revitalization efforts often attempt
to draw upon strategies that will make a city more competitive in the midst of globalization: attracting commercial development, enticing business and manufacturing firms with tax incentives and subsidization, investing in and highlighting
aspects of the city that can attract tourism and make the city more entertaining,
and enhancing current infrastructure such as schools, hospitals, and other services. Many of these efforts occur in strategic plans to comprehensively tic particular projects (such as the conversion of former warehouses into loft
apartments) to other streams of development (such as the creation of artists' districts and other commercial zones for retail outlets). But while community-building may occur simultaneously as these other efforts to rewrite urban space,
community-building often occurs in isolation from the broader activities, so that
local communities arc less local, and more localized, closed off from the context
in which they reside and specifically focused on a bounded place.Ji
Community-building programs such as CCls, which arc conceptualized more
often in philanthropic boardrooms than in neighborhood streets, ask neighborhood residents to build community amongst themselves. They assume that the
specific neighborhood can be the borders of a community and that the simple fact
of residency in a neighborhood is enough of a similarity in disposition that such
similarly positioned residents would naturally form a community, if only they have
the support to do so. Community-building offers residents the resources to make
a strong commitment to their place of residence, their local neighborhootl, and
the other people who also reside there. The belief that underpins this action is
that community is the infrastructure necessary for economic development to take
hold; by bu~din? community, residents arc engaging the process to bring investment to th~u neighborhood and allow for the alleviation of their poverty.
But this turn towards community in the programmatic efforts such as CC is
has failed to connect those experiencing poverty with the overarching causes of
that poverty. By focusing r~siden~~ attention on the local, community-building ignores the broader economic, political, and social forces that contribute to an impoverished neighborhood's ~ondi~on, forces that occur more vividly at broader
scales than the local'. By h~vmg ~c1ghborhood residents focus on community at a
loc~ scale, commuruty-buildcrs ignore how the urban, the regional, and even the
nat10nal. and global scales impact a specific neighborhood's status (Pastor, Jr., ct
al.) ..While the state~ go~J of many .c.CJs is to do just the opposite, by drawing attentt?n ~o co~mu~ity with.out cxp~citly developing community without unity, this
localizat:ton ~mds 1mpoveris hc? neighborhood residents to the place of their poverty. and denies th.cm the physical and social mobility that characterizes other inhabitants of the city.

census tract with over 40% of the households below the poverty line, the standard
set by IIUD) and commonality between these residents. rurthermore, the assumed difference between central city residents and suburban or regional residents must be removed as a hindrance to seeing the common fate that these
groups share. Indeed, community-building activities should be precisely that activities that provide the opportunity for previously "uncommon" social subjects
to see each other as already being in common, rather than as attempts to build
community upon assumed categories of people.
As such, community-building would not seek to make these categories operative (such as by a localized grouping of impoverished neighborhood residents together into a cohesive unit), but by challenging the mechanisms that would
articulate them together anc.I exclude them from being considered a part of other
categories. One way to begin engaging this process of creating community without unity, one that is more honest to how many people experience social life, is to
use community-building as an avenue to increase the rights to the city that its users can claim. 32 As cities become more and more global in the scale at which they
operate, the rights to the city need to be c.listributcd in a similar manner, and residents of the city, especially impoverished neighborhood residents who have too
often been characterized by and employed strategies based upon isolation, must
be able to articulate themselves as beholden to all of the users of the city, regardless of residency or other markers of classification. l'he community that could be
built could be one in which impoverished neighborhood residents can have a
greater say in the future of the city, because they can become to be seen (by themselves and by others) as being in common with others beyond the parameters of
the local neighborhood. Community-building, rather than a concerted effort to
connect people to the places to which they "belong," could be how belonging gets
refused. It coulc.I be the mechanism by which community is opened up, and commonality, beholdenncss, and collective action arc experienced as processes, instead
of as goals to obtain.

Conclusion
With all of this focus on community, more critical work is needed to investigate what community means and what community is to be built. ome recent
work has demonstrated the contested meaning of community by revealing its am biguity.33 Further work is necessary to comprehend not only why community resonates so loudly for many people (and who those people arc), but also to identify
what community means, and how it can be reworked into a radical political concept of collective identification, rather than a reactionary position in a globalizing
world. Such work would acknowledge that community is an important concept,
but that it needs critical evaluation to learn how it can become a powerful force in
bringing about positive change in people's lives.

. . Imagining community .with~ut unity as implemented in community-building,
1t 1s necessary for commuruty builders to lay aside an assumed
l · b
.
corrc aaon ctwccn
the residents of an impoverished area (often delineated as J al l' · I ·
a oc po Jttca unit or a
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